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In the immediate aftermath of the birth of the People’s Republic of China 
in 1949, there was an urgency to consolidate the Chinese nation that was 
still in a nascent stage recovering from the civil war between the Kuo-
mintang and the communists. The military victories of the People’s 
Liberation Army had to be translated into a new reality of uniting the 
Chinese nation and safeguarding it from any dangers. In the borderland 
regions of China, this meant the incorporation of the different ethnic 
groups with their varied histories and cultural traditions into a new nation 
with a socialist vision. In this future direction of a new nation, the idea of 
progress and universalism was a guiding principle and culture did not 
have an important place in this discourse (Tam 1988: 79).1 
In China this problem was complicated by the geographical diversity 
where more than two-thirds of the new China was the homeland of the 
ethnic minorities though they were dwarfed by the Han population, who 
formed the overwhelming majority in China comprising more than 92 per 
cent of the population but inhabiting only a third of the landmass of China 
(ibid.: 79). It becomes clear that the ethnic minorities inhabited vastly 
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different landscapes ranging from the cold deserts just north of Beijing 
beyond the Great Wall that comprised the traditional homelands of the 
Mongol peoples, to the uplands of Xinjiang, the forested regions of Yunan 
to the highlands of Tibet. These locales were characterised throughout 
history by an adaptation to diverse forms of production mainly nomadism 
and differentiated sharply from the intensively irrigated regions that 
formed the core of China. 
Further, most of these regions were relatively isolated from the 
heartland of China, and were also in contact with their neighbours and 
were part of the different culture areas of the neighbouring regions with 
whom they shared not only cultural patterns but also long histories. For 
most of the Mongols, the demarcation of inner and outer Mongolia was a 
modern phenomenon that did more harm to the Mongol nation than any 
other act in recent memory, and Bulag argues that this has made the 
Inner Mongols as the other to the Mongols (Bulag 1998: 171). Similarly, 
the Uighurs of Xinjiang and the other Muslim minorities like the Kazaks, 
Uzbeks, Salar, and Tatars were part of a larger Central Asian Turkic 
imaginary with a different script and a different religion of Islam (Soucek 
2000: 314). Another example concerns the tribal groups in Yunan and the 
borderlands of Burma like the Lisu who did not have a permanent state 
and practised an economy that relied on hunting and slash and burn 
cultivation (Zack 2017: 14, 161, 166). 
Slash and burn agriculture was the most widespread form of production 
in highland south-east Asia from the borders of north-eastern India to 
Vietnam in contrast to the settled agricultural plains of mainland South-
east Asia and is now understood as a distinct region (Michaud et al. 2016: 
440f.). These societies in the hills successfully resisted the intrusion of the 
state for more than a thousand years and thus practised shifting culti-
vation and other suitable forms of production with a loose political 
organisation and very little in material surplus. Willem Van Schendel 
characterised these borderland regions as Zomia that meant a non-state 
space (ibid.). It was made more famous and received an excellent 
academic reception with the publication by James C. Scott that introduced 
highland Asia as a geographical category in addition to the mainland and 
maritime Southeast Asia (Scott 2009: ix, xiv). Scott included large parts 
of Tibet in Zomia, and this sparked off another lively discussion 
(McConnell 2016: 47f.).   
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China was vast, but its vastness was also full of diversities marked by 
the main difference of the sharp contrast between the settled agricultural 
regions of the core of China and its famed wealth and prosperity that 
attracted the attention of the world through the ages to the impoverished 
landscapes on its borders (Murowchick 1994: 13f.). Mountains and 
deserts broke the continuity of the landscape and thus contributed to a 
discontinuous landscape that could not be wished away as the geographer 
Spykman contended that 'Geography does not argue, Geography simply 
is' (Kaplan 2012: 29). There were many other sharp contrasts like the 
settled agricultural villages of China that contrasted with the mobile 
settlements of the nomadic communities. Differences thus characterised 
China and its borders with inner Asia, between the Han and the nomad, 
and the best marker of this difference was the Great Wall of China 
(Turnbull 2012: 7). It is a common belief that the Great Wall of China was 
built to keep the invading nomads at bay and protect China, but this 
reveals only a part of the picture. The Great Wall of China was also 
intended to prevent any of the Chinese peasants from leaving (Laird 
2007: 32). One of the significant currents in the history of Inner Asia is 
the rivalry between the Han and the nomad. It is represented in a 
vigorous debate on the suitability of characterising the nomad as greedy 
or needy.2 These fault lines reveal the tensions in China that preoccupied 
the ruling elites from a very early date.  
In this context, the idea of marriage as a political tool and an 
expression of international relations emerged from the Han period when 
the border peoples become a threat to China. The Han-nomad binary also 
expressed in another form, where the nomads were represented as a 
problematic other (ibid.: 1092). In the historical memory of China, the 
rule of the Mongols and lastly the Manchus was a historical anomaly that 
did not go in the pattern of Chinese historical narrative. For the Chinese, 
both these groups were foreigners and also northern barbarians and thus 
intruders into Chinese lands. After the collapse of the Qing Empire and 
the rise of Nationalist China, the premier Sun Yat-Sen went to the tomb of 
the Yongle Emperor, the first Ming Emperor along with his cabinet (Laird 
2007: 240). It was a conscious and symbolic move as the Manchu were 
seen as foreigners, and Sun Yat-Sen consciously invoked the connection 
of the regime with the indigenous Chinese dynasty. The end of the 
Manchu rule evoked many reactions. There was the erasure of symbols 
connected with them. Mao, in school at that time, cut his and all his 
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classmates’ pigtails, symbolising freedom from Manchu oppression (ibid.). 
Such symbolic acts were meant to convey that the Manchu hairstyle of 
the Que was a hegemonic symbol and its erasure meant liberation. When 
such trends form the background of Chinese history, the tensions 
between the core and the periphery was already centuries old. 
By the time the People’s Liberation Army had exercised its control over 
mainland China and was moving into the peripheral areas the tension 
between the Han and the nomad was already centuries old and the 
expansion of the People’s Liberation Army was also understood in this 
vein as an elder brother trying to make the younger brother fall in line.3 
Therefore, the expansion into Tibet was accompanied by a legitimising 
narrative of modernisation and emancipation from imperialism was 
advanced to the wider world audience in the aftermath of 1959 and the 
fall of Old Tibet (Chen 2003: 128). This diatribe against centuries-old 
feudal serfdom strengthened the Chinese position and gave it a rhetorical 
strength that ran along with the popular mood throughout the world in 
favour of the currents of modernity and emancipation. The invasion was 
portrayed by the occupying forces of the People's Liberation Army as a 
moment of liberation from centuries-old tradition and the associated 
suffering of the working people of Tibet under a feudal theocracy 
legitimised by Buddhism (Zhang 2004: 52). 
The global audience well-received this narrative. The world was on the 
brink of a new historical moment. The past was largely blamed for the 
horrors of the present, and the future seemed promising. Thus, demoni-
sing the past also charted a new path to the future. Therefore, the 
narrative of linear progress in the future blurred the regional particulari-
ties. These were viewed only as aberrations. Whatever the route, the final 
destination was socialism, and many Chinese cadres sincerely believed in 
this universalist position and showed iron discipline (Norbu 1987: 110). 
Eyewitness accounts also recount the fervour of the communists in 
advancing their cause (ibid: 211). We see that the greatest casualty of 
this exercise was the forced path to modernity. The rule of the Fourteenth 
Dalai Lama was understood as the rule of a feudal theocracy and the 
culmination of a centuries-old tradition of oppression (Siren 1997: 48). It 
became a natural target to be erased to further the cause of socialism. 
History became the essential tool to legitimise the Communist rule over 
Tibet, and the battle for Tibet also became a battle for history. 
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On the Tibetan side, we see not only the Central Tibetan administration 
but also several exiled Tibetan writers and academicians and their 
supporters who include non-Tibetans also. The Central Tibetan adminis-
tration is the official name of the Tibetan Government in exile located in 
Dharamsala in India, which is also the seat of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama 
(McConnell 2016: 15). Such a case was also seen in Russia after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union with the ethnic minorities’ overwhelmingly 
favouring particularism over universalism. In the case of the nomadic 
regions, the idea of a linear progression could be advanced as the move-
ment to settled agriculture from nomadism and swidden agriculture was 
seen as a step forward (Scott 2009: 28). In the case of Tibet, a region 
with a strong historical tradition such a discourse met with strong resis-
tance and culminated in revolts (Shakabpa 1967: 316). 
Matters reached the climax in 1959 with the fall of Old Tibet and the 
flight of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama to India and the riots in Lhasa.4 Now 
the battle for Tibet also became a battle for legitimacy as the most 
important symbol of Tibet had fled, and history was at the centre stage of 
this battle. The essential questions framed by China were the modernising 
potential of Old Tibet, and the emancipation of the Tibetan masses from a 
feudal theocracy and this process of conquest of Tibet was called as the 
peaceful liberation of Tibet. One of the forceful exponents of this change 
is Israel Epstein a naturalised Chinese citizen whose book on the trans-
formation of Tibet extols the benefits of Chinese rule. He claims that it is 
an eye-witness, and ear witness accounts of the author’s travels in Tibet 
in 1955, 1965 and 1976 (Epstein 1983: 7).  
Today, the battle between the People’s Republic of China and the 
Central Tibetan Administration and the Free Tibet movement has spread 
to another new terrain—the ancient period of Tibet (Powers 2004: 3). 
Themes such as the imperial period of Tibet, the first Emperor Songtsen 
Gampo and his Chinese wife, Princess Wen Cheng Kong Jo, the place of 
Buddhism and more importantly the ethnogenesis of the Tibetan people, 
the Tibetan language and the decline of Buddhism along with the fall of 
the Tibetan Empire have all become essential landmarks in these 
polarised narratives. 
This article seeks to analyse these themes that have been a bone of 
contention trying to understand the sources and the methods employed 
along with the rhetorical positions of both these parties to see how 
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historical events have become sites of concerns informed mainly by 
modernist exigencies of nationalism. The oft-visited themes are the early 
Ramayana, the Tibetan script and the connection between the Indic 
myths and the ethnogenesis of the Tibetans and the spread of Buddhism 
along with some associated themes like the Tibetan script and medicine 
and Indic deities. The paper argues that most of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century modernist ideas of race, religion and progress that 
characterised these debates and are discarded globally continue to hold 
sway even now in a modified form. Further, the construction of these two 
opposing narratives also robs both the regions, especially the borderlands 
of their agency. A survey of the treatment of these themes shows that 
they have affected the Tibetan borderlands as a choice born out of 
strategic essentialism to present Tibet as a whole. This has become 
another subsumed narrative, and the recent rise of such regional narra-
tives reveals the multivocality of the debate. 
Tibetans enter the scene of recorded history with the rise of the 
Yarlung dynasty in the seventh century CE, and the enormous expansion 
of the military power takes place under this dynasty along with the 
introduction of the Tibetan state, Tibetan script and the introduction of 
Buddhist religion to Tibet. In short, the transition from a pre-state to a 
durable state structure and that too as an effective martial power is 
accomplished under the kings of the Yarlung dynasty of central Tibet 
(Smith 1996: 52). Traditional Tibetan history begins by tracing the contri-
butions of a list of forty-one rulers with an emphasis on the three eminent 
empire builders, Songtsen Gampo, Trisong Detsen and Ralpachen 
(Shakabpa 1967: 25, 49). All these rulers belonged to the Yarlung 
dynasty so named after the Yarlung valley in central Tibet. It is surprising 
to note that even the Chinese narratives are also focused on the Yarlung 
rulers and the first Emperor Songtsen Gampo and devote considerable 
space to him (Wang and Suo 1984: 15, 17, 33).  
Both the narratives are poles apart, and a deeper reading of the two 
versions of Songtsen Gampo would reveal the fault lines. As a historical 
personality, Songtsen    Gampo ascended the throne at the age of 13 in 
the year 614 CE and ruled till 648 CE and based on textual study 
Shakabpa says he lived till the age of 82 (Shakabpa 1967: 29). Some 
aspects of his personality were affected by myth-making, and there are 
layers of myth shrouding Songtsen Gampo. In the modern Tibetan narra-
tives, Songtsen Gampo occupies a prominent place for many reasons 
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including his patronage and introduction of Buddhism to Tibet and his 
wide-ranging conquests that marked the birth of the Tibetan empire and 
his matrimonial alliances (ibid.: 25f.). 
When we talk of marriages and the ruling families of China, we notice 
that marriage was used as a political and diplomatic tool since the Chin 
period.5 Marriage alliances or ho-Ch'in translated literally as harmonious 
kinship was new in the Han period and continued well into the Tang 
period when the Tibetans enter the scene (ibid.: 113). Songtsen Gampo’s 
marriages with the princess of Nepal and the princess of Tang China are 
examples of such unions. Nepal under the Malla dynasty had connections 
with neighbouring Tibet, and Songtsen Gampo wanted to marry Bhrikuti 
Devi, the Nepalese princess who was the daughter of Anshuvarman, the 
Nepalese king of the Malla dynasty (Shakabpa 1967: 25). At first, 
Anshuvarman did not accept the proposal and later after pressure from 
the Yarlung ruler soon acquiesced, and Brihikuti Devi became Songtsen 
Gampo’s bride and went to Lhasa (ibid.). However, there are no 
significant narratives of the military engagement between Songtsen 
Gampo and the Nepalese ruler, but in the case of China, the contacts 
have become a matter of contestation (Powers 2004: 3-5).  
According to Chinese narratives, Songtsen Gampo married Wen Chen 
Kong Jo, the daughter of Tang Tai Zong the ruler of the Tang dynasty in 
the Chinese city of Xian and this is an event that is hailed as the union of 
the Tibetans and the Chinese and has entered popular books and 
textbooks also (Quick Access 2010: 102). Opposed to this narrative is the 
Tibetan narrative where this story is narrated not in the sense of 
cooperation between the Tibetans and Chinese but as a show of power 
relations when Tibet was a military power. The horsemen are interpreted 
not as the retinue of Songtsen Gampo on a friendly mission but part of his 
army out to serve an ultimatum to the Tang emperor Tai Zong. After the 
marriage, interpreted as a victory by the Tibetans or in the Chinese 
narratives as a symbol of Tang-Tubo alliance, and in a ceremonial escort, 
Princess Wen Chen Kong Jo to Lhasa and both the representations are 
vastly different (Powers 2004: 31-3). 
The Chinese sources do not make much mention of the Nepalese 
princess but dwell on the Tang princess and her contributions to 'civilising' 
Tibet including the introduction of Buddhism to Tibet obscuring the fact 
that the Nepalese princess was also a Buddhist. Incidentally for the 
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devout Tibetans, both the Nepalese and the Chinese princess are more 
than historical personalities and are deified and worshipped as the Green 
Tara (Belsa) and the White Tara (Gyasa) respectively. Their images are 
enshrined in the Jokhang temple in Lhasa, one of the oldest Buddhist 
temples in Tibet (Shakabpa 1967: 25). For the average Tibetan, these 
deities were not representative of a power struggle though modern 
historians have mainly invested these categories in reading them.  
The Chinese ruling families used marriage as a diplomatic tool, and this 
is evident in their matrimonial alliances with several nomadic societies, 
but not with agricultural societies. This raises many questions.6 According 
to current understanding, the Chinese princess who married into the 
nomadic ruling families acted as a power element and helped to further 
Chinese interests is one of the roles. During the Tang period, there were a 
total of 16 marriages between the Chinese princess and the Turks, Khitan, 
Khotan, Tibetans and other nomadic peoples. In two cases, Tang China 
was forced into accepting marriages; one was with the Tibetan King 
Songtsen Gampo and Princess Wen Cheng Kong Jo (ibid.: 123). The 
princess carried a large retinue and costly gifts indicating the importance 
of the marriage for the Tang dynasty, a fact that is much publicised. Like 
other Chinese princess married to nomadic rulers, Wen-Cheng also served 
as a cultural ambassador.7 
It is one of the points of departure in the modern narratives produced 
by the Chinese government, and there is also a drama produced and 
enacted almost 180 times a year.8 History is being falsified round the year 
with an elaborate state apparatus and a marriage of technology and 
extravaganza.9 There is a lengthy description given by Wang Furen and 
Suo Wenquing about the arrival of Wen Cheng to Tibet (Wang & Suo 
1984: 18-20). They describe in detail the large retinue loaded with costly 
gifts as a spectacle to behold (ibid.: 18). They further write that all the 
commoners welcomed this retinue and laud it as a symbol of the Tibetan-
Tang alliance. This alliance is associated with the civilising mission by 
these authors, and the entry of the Chinese princess overwhelmed the 
Tibetan masses. Instead, the fact that Tang China was forced into 
marriage by the superior military strength of the Tibetans is completely 
absent and thus becomes an important site of contestation.10 
The finer details of the power struggles become clear when we examine 
the process of marriage in detail against the larger background. Songtsen 
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Gampo had initially proposed a matrimonial alliance with the Tang in 634 
CE and the Tang emperor Tai Zong was almost ready and planned to use 
the Tibetans as a counterweight against another nomadic group. This 
nomadic group was the Tuyuhun who was an emergent threat, and in 635 
CE, their king No-ho-so objected to this marriage. This was because the 
Tuyuhun were now actively in alliance with the Tang and therefore 
interested in promoting a pro-Tang policy (ibid: 114). As Songtsen 
Gampo was rebuffed, he attacked both the Tuyuhun and the Tang, and it 
is after the military encounters that the power of the Tibetans became 
clear. It is under these circumstances that Tang China had to accept the 
matrimonial alliance where Tibetan troops were in a strong or equal 
position but not in an inferior position (ibid.: 115). The associated aspects 
describing the marriage are to be read against this larger background of 
the relationship between the Hans and the nomadic societies. 
 In addition to Nepalese and Chinese wives, Songtsen Gampo also had 
Tibetan wives who rarely make it to the historical narratives. We also 
have borderland narratives of the story of Wen Cheng Kong Jo in Tibet 
that do not conform to the standard monolithic narratives of the Tibetan 
exiles and also do not correspond to the Chinese narratives.11 One 
narrative from eastern Tibet says that Wen-Cheng had an affair with Gar 
Tongtsen, a minister of Songtsen Gampo and also had a child from this 
relationship that was stillborn.12 What this all reveals is that there are 
multiple narratives of the same event within Tibet itself. They reveal 
many layers of understanding and also many diverse receptions of the 
events like the localised receptions. 
In most cases, we may read these actions of the individual actors like 
Songtsen Gampo as representative of a larger entity like the Tibetan 
nation as the union of two individuals is taken to represent the union of 
two peoples (Fen & Qiang 2019: 364). The term race is still employed by 
Fen and Qiang to understand peoples as representative of racial 
categories (ibid.: xxii, 4, 363). Such categories are no longer employed 
though the Tibetan writers also used them earlier when the understanding 
of such categories was accepted (Shakabpa 1967: 5). Further, these 
individuals also could influence decisions on a large scale like the 
introduction of Buddhism what it ultimately reveals is that there is a 
tension between the two parties and most of these transactions are a part 
of the ancient Sino-Tibetan relations that have become the main bone of 
contention. Marriage was not just between China and the nomadic powers 
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but also between the different nomadic powers and Songtsen Gampo’s 
marriage to Bhrikuti Devi can also be understood in this vein.13 It also 
reveals the conventional explanation of marriages with Chinese princess 
as a means for the nomadic powers to get material benefits do not 
exhaust the potential of such actions (ibid.). 
There are many dimensions, and the rise of different nomadic powers 
on the borders of China reveals the levels of interactions as there are no 
matrimonial alliances with certain nomadic powers when they are weak. 
When they posed no threat to China, such powers are ignored, and the 
classic example is of Tibet where we do not find any example of ho-ch'in 
after the collapse of the Yarlung dynasty. The two marriages between the 
Tibetans, i.e. between Songtsen Gampo and Wen-Cheng and later 
between princess Chin Cheng and a Tibetan king happen when Tibetan 
kings are in ascendance (ibid.: 130). Like the first marriage between 
Songtsen Gampo that bore fruition only years after he made the initial 
proposal, the same is the case with the second marriage of a Tibetan king 
and a Chinese princess. 
This has to be seen in the context of Tibet’s expansion from the middle 
of the seventh century CE. Tibet sent marriage proposals to China in 658 
CE which were refused and later in 679 CE through princess Wen-Cheng 
which was again refused (ibid.: 114). The reason advanced for the second 
refusal was that princess T’ai-p’ing whose hand the Tibetans had asked 
for marriage had already become a Taoist nun. However, the tide turned 
in 703 CE with mounting Tibetan attacks on the Tang, and Empress Wu 
agreed to give princess Chin Cheng’s hand in marriage. The actual 
marriage between Chin Cheng and the Tibetan king took place in 710 CE 
(ibid.: 130). All these facts demonstrate that there are many important 
variables to be considered when we take marriage into account as it 
meant much more than the union of two people. It is easy to read that 
marriage alliances were also a political tool and the princess functioned as 
ambassadors as in the case of Wen-Cheng and Chin Cheng. 
Further, marriage with one nomadic group also led to their loyalty and 
alliance in the complex rivalries as many examples would show. For 
instance, the Tang alliance with the Tuyuhun led to the refusal of a 
princess in marriage to Songtsen Gampo. Thus reading the marriage of 
Songtsen Gampo as a straightforward event would obscure many parts of 
FOCUS 
131 
the narratives, including the regional narratives with the local versions of 
this event.14 
History has become an influential tool for China to legitimise its rule 
over Tibet. In this process, the Chinese repeatedly stress the unity of the 
Tibetans and the Chinese as belonging to one family. However, China and 
Tibet have diverse histories, landscapes and cultures, and one necessarily 
has to invoke the idea of the difference. That is because the environment 
has been of the most important factors for the differential evolution of 
identities in China and Tibet (Smith 1996: xix). For the Chinese 
narratives, this idea of difference is also because of certain divergences 
and a search for common origins; unity is fixated and surfaces in their 
narratives on Tibet. Therefore, in addition to the Sino-Tibetan relations, 
the ethnogenesis of the different peoples is also another important 
domain of contestation (Powers 2004: 30, 109). It is also an area where 
myth and history collide. Unlike the story of the Yarlung dynasty where 
there are historical personalities whose presence is not disputed by both 
the parties, in the case of the origins of the Tibetan people, the story 
becomes more complicated, drawing mainly from a much-celebrate myth. 
According to the Tibetans, the Tibetan race originated from the union of 
a red-faced monkey and a mountain ogress and the monkey is identified 
as an incarnation of Avalokitesvara (Shakabpa 1967: 5). Another myth 
traces the origins of the Tibetans in India and recounts the days during 
the epic period of Mahabharata when there were warfare and considerable 
unsettlement in India that led to the migration of Tibetans to the land of 
snows to escape the conflicts (ibid.: 5). We see that the ideas of race are 
no longer employed as a category of analysis in social sciences and the 
ideas of race which is employed here actually draws from what we can 
call as a common sense understanding of race.15 In the commonsensical 
understanding of race, the phenotype is considered as the most important 
physical marker and is to employed only cautiously and not read as race 
and Warren Smith does this without reading phenotype as race (Smith 
1996: 11). Further, in such an understanding, groups belonging to the 
same race are supposed to be essentialist categories. Therefore, it would 
be wrong to use the idea of a race to signify unity between the Tibetans 
and the Chinese. It only serves the purpose of showing that the Tibetans 
are at a distance from the Chinese. One can also notice a perceptible shift 
in the employment of the term race and the shift to the more acceptable 
term phenotype. 
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Interestingly, there was only one anthropometric survey done in Tibet 
and by Gordon Bowles in eastern Kham which is a borderland of Tibet and 
China. He dwells on the trait of the epicanthic fold of the eye that is 
considered an essential trait of the Mongoloid phenotype, and according 
to this premise, about 90 per cent of the Chinese have some degree of an 
inner fold (Smith 1996: 10). For the complete eye folds the figures for 
Chinese along with the Chiang average around 44 per cent, while in 
eastern Tibet it is only eight per cent. It reaches a further low of 2.65 per 
cent in parts of eastern Tibet (ibid.) What we get from this survey is that 
while the data needed to make such conjectures needs to be vast and 
robust, we cannot rely on such data as it is neither voluminous nor is it 
robust. A single survey may have laid to rest some of the longstanding 
assumptions of racial unity between the Chinese and the Tibetans, but it 
is not sufficient. 
Notwithstanding this fact, there may be other reasons to attribute India 
as the origin of the Tibetan people as we also encounter similar narra-
tives. In the case of the origin of the Korean dynasty, the Koreans again 
trace Ayodhya in India as one of the sources of their origin as there was a 
Korean princess who supposedly hailed from India and this event is 
celebrated a very year (Kishore 2016: 26). Therefore, the reason for the 
Tibetans to trace India as one of the sources may be deeper and go 
beyond religion as Buddhism was introduced only later into Tibet in the 
seventh century CE.  
Tibetans and Chinese were supposed to belong to one family, and they 
thus represent the five races of China according to the Kuomintang’s idea, 
and the flag of the Kuomintang also represented this feature.16 The 
communist party narrative also has the five stars representing the five 
ethnic groups of Han, Manchu, Mongol, Uighur and the Tibetan ethnic 
groups. In the Chinese language the term for ethnicity is minzu. Such a 
reading is wrong and based on false ideas (ibid.). In a recent article on 
the Formation the Chinese nation and its multi-ethnic groups in the 
inaugural issue of the Journal of Anthropology and Ethnology, published 
by a one of the reputed publishers Springer, the focus is to explain the 
diversities and integration (Fei 2017: 1). The avowed aim of the journal is 
also a corrective to the traditional bias of non-Chinese scholars writing on 
China. 
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About the explanation of diversity and the origins of the Tibetans, the 
Chinese position is articulated here clearly. The origin of the Tibetan 
people is traced to the Qiang people though not forcefully but in a 
roundabout way (Fei 2017: 22). According to the Han language diction-
aries composed during the Han period, ethnic origins of the Tibetans are 
from the Fa Qiang group, as the Fa Qiang was also one of the ethnic 
groups in the Tibetan plateau and had relations with the Gansu Qiang 
tribe (ibid.). A series of conjectures are drawn based on the views of 
some linguistics. These linguistics include the Qiang, Pumi and Lhoba 
languages as part of the Tibetan language family. However, as the link-
ages are not clear, the article concedes that even if the Qiang were not 
the source of the Tibetan peoples, their role in the ethnogenesis of the 
Tibetans is substantial (ibid.). 
Further, there is also another assertion about a group of peoples called 
the Baima Tibetans who do not speak a Tibetan language and also do not 
believe in Lamaism in the Aba county (ibid.). Along with language, there 
is a close relationship between the Han and Tibetan languages. The 
spread of Tibetan culture and language also meant the Tibetanisation of 
culture, and in this process, many societies like the Mongols became 
Tibetanised as they adopted Tibetan Buddhism and many other aspects of 
Tibetan culture. The Fourth Dalai Lama, Yonten Gyatso hailed from 
Mongolia (Mullin 2001: 181). In the case of the Lhoba and the Moinba 
people also we notice a similar process of Tibetanisation. The Monpa and 
the Lhoba people are also found in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh 
that borders Tibet, and is considered by China as a part of their country 
(Klieger 2015: 58). During the pre-modern period, Mon Yul or the land of 
Monpas was also part of the Tibetan cultural area and was so acknow-
ledged. Here the language spoken is the Monpa language, but there is no 
doubt about the Tibetanness of these people.17 The best proof of this is 
that the Sixth Dalai Lama, Tsangyang Gyatso hailed from this region 
(Mullin 2001: 245, 274). In the Tibetan understanding, there is room for 
accommodating difference between the Tibetan Great tradition and the 
various little traditions of the peripheries and the Tibetanised groups. 
About the use of the term Qiang as an ethnic group we notice that 
sometimes it is used to signify the Tibetans in the ancient period and at 
times the Qiang are also represented as outsiders. In the opinion of 
Warren Smith, this contradictory position can be understood as the Qiang 
were absorbed by the Tibetans and the Qiang people prevailed on the 
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Tibetans in the early period before the rise of the Yarlung dynasty (Smith 
1996: 5-8). In the article by Xiaotong Fei that traces the origin of the 
Chinese nation to the core of the Han ethnicity it argues that on one side 
the Han ethnicity went on assimilating other nationalities, and the exact 
opposite is the Qiang, who went on decreasing in size as it was the supply 
base of the people for most of the ethnicities and mostly the Han (Fei 
2017: 22). The article also gives an example of the Qiang in modern 
China, pointing to their dwindling numbers (ibid.). One may examine this 
in detail by dwelling on another article from Taiwan by Wang Ming Ke 
which points at the disconnection between the present-day Qiang and the 
ancient Qiang.18  
In the ancient period, the Qiang was a generic term for many of the 
peoples of the borderlands in the West of China. The present-day identi-
fication of a group of people as Qiang and reading their history backwards 
as the history of Qiang is erroneous as the present day Qiang started 
using this ethnonym for self-identification only from this century (ibid.). 
Many of the present days Qiang mentioned by Xiaotong Fei did not hear 
the term Qiang or consider themselves to be Qiang before 1950 as Wang 
Ming Ke has demonstrated based on fieldwork and also the study of texts 
(ibid.). The problem as pointed out by him is that modern Han Chinese 
historians do not have a new take on the Qiang but only a reworked idea 
of the Qiang as the western frontier people of China (ibid.: 145). This 
statement seems to read the present in the past explanations about the 
various nationalities that are historically problematic.  
The explanation of the similarities between the Han and the Tibetan 
languages also hide more than they reveal as the Tibetan script is 
undoubtedly Indian in origin and is phonetic in contrast to the ideographic 
Chinese script and was derived from the monasteries of eastern India 
during the seventh century CE.19 As devout Buddhists, the Tibetans 
venerated Indian influences as it was the birthplace of the Buddha. 
Therefore, some element was glossed over and is apparent. Beyond these 
binaries also exists a new Tibetan narrative of indigeneity that acknow-
ledges Indic influences.20 Many of the Indic relations are understood but 
from a different set of power relations that is missing in this whole Sino-
Tibetan binary narrative (Huber 2008: 3). The relations between India 
and Tibet were historically asymmetrical, and India was referred to as the 
parent and Tibet the child, and there are many speculations about this 
adoration for India. However, as Toni Huber has pointed out, there is also 
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a dark side to this relationship, but we do not get references to any 
loathing of India (ibid.: 3-5). In the relations between the nomadic armies 
of the early Tibetan rulers and China, there is an evident tension between 
the two that is absent when we examine the Indo-Tibetan relations. 
After the death of Mao, there was a relative relaxation of autocracy in 
Tibet, and during this period of the late 1970s and the early 1980s many 
new works came up in the Tibetan language, and they sought to 
understand the history of Tibet afresh. One of the important voices of 
these new writings is Dhondup Gyal whose works are canonised on both 
sides of the border (in Tibet and India) and posit a new path.21 An 
important issue with much at stake is the role of Indic influences that is 
important for us. One of the important projects that Dhondup Gyal had 
taken up was the translation of the Ramayana (Lin in Hartley & Schiaffini-
Vedani 2008: 93). For him, the translation of the Ramayana was not a 
passive reception of Indian influence in Tibet without any Tibetan agency 
as many devout Buddhists or the Chinese would have constructed. 
Examining the context of the transmission of the Ramayana into Tibet, 
Dhondup Gyal posited that it was during a period when Tibet was at the 
height of its military power and was therefore in a position to choose its 
historical course (ibid.: 93-6). 
Further, the region of Dunhuang through which this translation of 
Ramayana entered Tibet was also a region that was not in the direct line 
of Buddhist transmission but a region open to many influences including 
various Inner Asian influences. Dhondup Gyal, therefore, viewed the 
Ramayana, not just an example of Indian literature but world literature 
(ibid.: 94). It is also pertinent to point out here that Ramayana studies 
have blossomed since the last two decades in India and there are many 
Ramayanas voicing the narratives of many ethnic groups in South and 
Southeast Asia. They also include Ramayanas in many non-Hindu trade-
tions (Richman 1991: 3). Most of these Ramayanas deviate from the 
Ramayana of Valmiki replacing local characters and concerns. Among the 
other projects that Dhondup Gyal had taken up was a re-reading of Sakya 
Pandita’s Kavyadarsa which was a Sanskrit text on aesthetics translated 
by Sakya Pandita (Schiaffini-Vedani 2008: 96). 
As one of the luminaires of Tibetan literature and an eminent historical 
personality, Sakya Pandita was the regent of the Ngawang Lobsang 
Gyatso, the Fifth Dalai Lama and was held in high esteem and continues 
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to be in the Tibetan communities. However, after the fall of old Tibet 
some new voices also sprung up and one of the examples if of Dhondup 
Gyal who is important to us for reasons that he takes a different position 
from that of the Indian and the Chinese influences as if ancient Tibet was 
a tabula rasa. It also reveals that there is more to Indian influences than 
Buddhism, and this exercise would reveal that conscious choice of the 
Tibetans in charting their historical course.   
In this whole discourse on the Tibetan royalty and the Tibetan 
language, the Chinese never dwelt at length about the Bon religion, the 
pre-Buddhist religion (Bon) of Tibet though there is some introductory 
reference in many places (Wang & Suo 1984: 51). Here, it is important to 
note that most of the kings mentioned in the list of the forty-one 
traditional kings of Tibet were Bonpos or followers of the Bon religion 
(Kværne & Thargyal 1993: 13). It is not a prominent issue in the Sino-
Tibetan relations as Tibet was a warrior nation then and military power in 
its own right. The Bon literature has also become so much Buddhicised in 
the last thousand years that the warrior element is glossed over in favour 
of the dharma kings or chos-rgyal (Norbu 2001: 408). 
The friendship between the Tang and the Tubo (as the Tibetans were 
called) kingdoms is the frame of reference through which the Sino-
Tibetan relations are understood. The rise of Tibet as a military power 
cannot also be understood if we read the three dharma kings as Buddhist 
rulers only since these rulers do not conform to idealised Buddhist 
prototypes. As a btsan po (emperor), the Emperor Srong-btsan Ga-mpo 
was a ruthless military warrior, and the warrior nation that he led, was 
feared by many of the nomadic powers of Inner Asia (Norbu 1998: 365). 
China had to encounter these nomadic powers from the time of the Chin 
dynasty, reflecting one of the main currents of Chinese history, the 
conflict between the Han and the nomad.22 The use of blood sacrifices 
during important events was common among the Bonpo rulers (Cantwell 
& Mayer 2008: 20). One of the sites of enacting such blood sacrifices was 
during the treaty between the Tang dynasty and the Tibetan rulers (ibid.: 
28). Pan Yihong has painstakingly researched the six Treaties between 
the Tibetans and the Tang dynasty with translations and has come up 
with meaningful findings that are at a considerable distance from the 
official Chinese statist narratives. Two of the significant facts not 
publicised are the revision of the wordings in the Treaty of 783 CE 
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between Tang and Tibet and the official letter from Tang to Tibet in 781 
CE (Pan 1992: 152).23   
In the long history of dealings with the neighbours, the Chinese usually 
had the upper hand but with considerable difficulties as the nomads had a 
strong martial tradition and therefore the Chinese considered the 
foreigners as barbarians. In this context, the treaties were a reflection of 
the Sino-centric view. They were always presented as either treaty of 
Chinese dominance or friendship; not as Treaties between equals. Under 
the Tang dynasty, China was forced to accept the terms of the Tibet, and 
this comes into full display in the double practice of Chinese and Tibetan 
rituals in the Treaties of 762, 783 and 821/822 (cit. in Yihong 1992: 
152).24 
During the height of Imperial Tibet’s success, the armies of the Bonpo 
warriors were the fighting force who created the Tibetan Empire and their 
orientation was far from being Buddhist (Norbu 2012: 133). One of the 
well-known episodes in Tibetan history is the end of the Tibetan Empire 
that collapsed as a result of the Buddhist-Bonpo conflict in the aftermath 
of Raplachen’s death. According to traditional Tibetan explanations, Lang 
Darma, the apostate who killed Ralpachen was a demon with two horns 
on his head (Laird 2007: 67). His death led to unsettled conditions that 
have been interpreted differently. A Marxist explanation given by the 
Chinese writers considers it a class conflict between the landlords and the 
landowners that led to the ruin of both classes in a civil war (Wang and 
Suo 1984: 29). Both these readings are ideologically polarised and tend 
to view events only through specific ideological frames, viz. Buddhist and 
Marxist. We are on the stronger historical ground when we see that the 
Lang Darma’s predecessor king Muni Tsenpo initiated a kind of land 
reforms, and this led to a reaction amongst certain sections (Shakabpa 
1967: 46). 
Dawa Norbu’s interpretation reveals the inadequacies of both explana-
tions, and he starts by pointing out that during the early period, 
Buddhism was a Lhasa based court religion and not spread all over Tibet 
and therefore investing Tibet with a Buddhist religious frame is ana-
chronistic. Lang Darma’s actions were also a Bonpo reaction to the 
pacifist policy of Buddhism (Norbu 1998: 368f.). As such the end of the 
Tibetan Empire unintentionally released the pent up energies of Buddhism 
and laid the basis for a new Buddhist revival that is known as phyi-dar or 
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the second diffusion of Buddhism (ibid.: 369). It was due to the efforts of 
the Buddhist missionaries during the second diffusion that Buddhism 
became the dominant religion and the credit for setting it off should go to 
Lang Darma unintentionally (ibid.). We also cannot negate social tensions 
prevalent in early Tibet as there are not many details. According to Dawa 
Norbu, the lama historians of Tibet obscured all aspects of feudalism in 
their narratives of Old Tibet by what he calls an act of 'masterly evasion'. 
Lamas were the literary elite in Tibet, and therefore, they wrote with a 
bias in favour of Buddhism that is understood (Norbu 1987: 9). However, 
these factors in no way establish the Chinese claims of civilising early 
Tibet. 
The idea of civilising Tibet was narrative the Chinese extended to all 
the nomadic powers on the borderlands and also continues in the modern 
period as the ideas of development and modernisation.25 However, the 
difference was that the Tibetans already had a Great Tradition based on 
Buddhism. This great tradition and the prevalence of a script indicate a 
pre-existing knowledge base that is not easy to dismiss. The script then 
becomes another aspect of intense debate, along with medicine and 
religion. The early Tibetans were influenced in these aspects from India 
and created the Tibetan script based on Indian models. 
Similarly, the Tibetan system of medicine also followed the three 
humoral systems of the Ayurveda of India and not the two humoral 
systems of the Chinese, e.g. the yin and the yang. While ascribing to the 
origin of Ayurveda, the Tibetan system of medicine called the rgyud-bzhi 
gives a mythical explanation of its origin based on ancient Indian under-
standings (Donden 2003: 34). The difference is that while Brahma is the 
originator of the ancient system, giving the knowledge to Bhaisayajguru 
and the Asvins, the Tibetans substitute Buddha for Brahma (Rajesh 
2001:37). One must understand that in Tibet, there is not direct repli-
cation of all aspects of Indian influence. Local realities mediate such 
influences, which could not be erased and were powerful. One of the oft-
repeated examples is the introduction of Buddhism, and when the Tibetan 
Emperor Trisong Detsen invited the Indian monk Santaraksita, the first 
mission failed. Santaraksita attempted to build a temple at Samye on the 
outskirts of Lhasa, but the local spirits thwarted his efforts. Whatever he 
built in the day was undone at night and so his efforts to subjugate the 
local spirits came to a nought and thus Santaraksita gave up (Shakabpa 
1967: 36). 
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While returning to India, he suggested the name of Acharya Padma-
sambhava. He was, subsequently, invited. Acharya Padmasambhava 
succeeded and is known in Tibet as Guru Rinpoche and is one of the most 
famous Indian personalities to be venerated. Unlike Santaraksita, who 
wanted to eliminate the spirits, Padmasambhava made them a part of 
guardian deities of Tibet, and thus he succeeded. Thus the Tibetan 
Buddhist pantheon includes not only the Indian tantric divinities but also 
the indigenous Bon deities whom Padmasambhava assimilated into 
Buddhism. This process of syncretism explains the hybrid nature of 
Tibetan Buddhism, and this explains other aspects of Indian influence.   
In the contemporary period, the Chinese idea of a nation and it border 
policies that were a result of the centuries of dealing with the nomadic 
neighbours have conditioned the writing of history. Two important 
dissimilarities surface while dealing with the aspect of China and Tibet 
over the border and the geo-bodies of the nation. Ancient China’s 
problems with her neighbours are also a result of her border policies as 
the nomadic neighbours were labelled as barbarians and were the other of 
the settled Hans. Sino-barbarian differentiation ensured that the barbar-
ians needed to be domesticated and brought into a sedentary agricultural 
system (Smith 1996: 21). The modern narratives of China about the 
various ethnic groups stress their belongings to the motherland, but there 
is a problem of applying this concept to Tibet. Tibetans regard their 
country as pha-yul (pha meaning father and yul translated as land) 
signifying the vast differences in their perceptions of relationship with the 
land (Tibetan Bulletin 1986: 18). Tibetan culture areas in Russia also met 
with a similar treatment though not so harsh as that of many other 
nationalities (Saunders & Strukov 2010: 292). 
One encounters the problem of tracing influences from neighbouring 
regions that is a part of the culture Area. As pointed out earlier, the Dalai 
Lamas or any reincarnate can hail from any part of the Tibetan Culture 
areas; they do not conform to the stereotype of a Tibetan within Tibetan 
borders. In the early part of the twentieth century a Buryat Mongol Lama, 
Agvan Dorjieff, who was a subject of the Russian Czar was an influential 
figure in Lhasa and also an assistant tutor of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama 
(Snelling 1993: 35). Most of his actions were suspect as he was a political 
subject of the Czar of Russia whom he had also met in person in 1898 
through Rasputin and was an important religious figure in Tibet (Fleming 
2012: 25). British India’s incursions into Tibet produced a narrative of 
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Dorjieff as a Russian spy (ibid.: 26). After the Bolshevik revolution, 
Dorjieff returned to Russia and his loyalties were suspect and imprisoned 
and later died as a heartbroken man (Snelling 1993: vi, 247). To assert 
that his death was in part due to the suffering inflicted on him based on 
the Stalinist ideas of a homogenous nation would not be an under-
statement. 
 A similar narrative of tracing a homogenous Chinese nation from the 
past exists, and by extending this project of homogeneity to the study of 
ancient Tibet, we only witness some coercion. Therefore, the constant 
invocation of Bodhgaya as a sacred centre in the ancient Tibetan 
narratives though it lies far beyond the confines of physical Tibet exem-
plifies this situation (Huber 2008: 291). With the rise of the Tibetan 
Buddhist state in the tenth century CE Bodhgaya, the place where the 
Buddha attained liberation becomes the centre of the sacred geography 
for the Tibetans. In the previous period before the seventh century CE, 
when the Bonpos held power, the sacred geography of the Bon religion 
was Olmo Lungring (Rinpoche et al. 2016: 2). 
Unlike Bodhgaya, Olmo Lungring the birthplace of Tonpa Shenrab 
Miwo, the founder of the Bon religion cannot be located, though there are 
sophisticated cartographic descriptions of the same. Possibly Olmo 
Lungring is at a centre with four rivers flowing in the four cardinal direc-
tions towards Khotan to the north, Orgyen to the west, India to the south 
and China to the east (Coleman 2016: 13). It is clear that like Bodhgaya, 
Olmo Lungring lies outside Tibet, to the west of Tibet (Dakpa and 
Rinpoche 2006: 6). This does not preclude both these sacred sites from 
being a part of the Tibetan imaginary. Similar examples are found around 
the world. Modern-day anxieties of seeking congruence between physical 
geography and sacred geography do not fit into the earlier narratives and 
would only amount to reading history backwards. 
The battle for ancient Tibet, therefore, is a battle that is primarily 
informed by modern concerns of which the need to incorporate Tibet into 
China is the main project. Extending this argument, we see that the need 
to give strong legitimacy to a shared past leads to distortion of facts and 
thus emerges a contestation about the interpretation of facts. Both the 
parties, the People’s Republic of China and the Free Tibet movement have 
taken clear positions, and there is no dispute among them regarding 
some of the main events and actors in ancient Tibetan history. Issues of 
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contestation immediately arise regarding the interpretation of events and 
one may say that a limiting factor in the Tibetan narrative is the paucity 
of sources. Unlike other nomadic societies on the borderlands of China 
whose history has to be entirely constructed based on Chinese sources as 
they were a pre-literate people, Tibetans have written records. However, 
they could not produce massive amounts of literature in the early period 
as compared to China, where the annals composed in the court meticu-
lously recorded a large number of events. Ultimately, we can get a clearer 
understanding of ancient Tibet only through archaeological studies that 
are very meagre. 
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